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We  study  a  trade-oﬀ  between  economic  and  environmental  indicators  using  a  two-stage 
optimal  control  setting  where  the  player  can  switch  to  a  cleaner  technology,  that  is 
environmentally  “eﬃcient”,  but  economically  less  productive.  We  provide  an  analytical 
characterization of the solution paths for the case where the considered utility functions are 
increasing  and  strictly  concave  with  respect  to  consumption  and  decreasing  linearly  with 
respect to the pollution stock. In this context, an isolated player will either immediately start 
using the environmentally eﬃcient technology, or for ever continue applying the old and 
“dirty” technology. In a two-player (say, two neighbor countries) dynamic game where the 
pollution results from a sum of two consumptions, we prove existence of a Nash (open-loop) 
equilibrium, in which each player chooses the technology selﬁshly i.e., without considering 
the  choice  made  by  the  other  player.  A  Stackelberg  game  solution  displays  the  same 
properties. Under cooperation, the country reluctant to adopt the technology as an equilibrium 
solution,  chooses  to  switch  to  the  cleaner  technology  provided  it  beneﬁts  from  some 
“transfer” from the environmentally eﬃcient partner. 
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1. Introduction
The trade-oﬀ between economic performance and environmental eﬃciency is becoming a key
aspect of economic policy debates at all levels, as it transpires from the discussion around the
Kyoto protocol. Indeed, for many authors, such trade-oﬀs exist, and dealing with them is a
matter of urgency. For example, [1] have found a decreasing relationship between economic
performance, as measured by the return to capital employed, and a composite environmental
indicator computed from emissions of SO2 and NOx, and chemical demand for oxygen in
German, Italian, Dutch and British industries over the period 1995-1997. In a context of some
speciﬁc industries, at an earlier date [2] have argued that the share of environmental costs in
total manufacturing costs might well be a considerable burden, and is by no way oﬀset by any
kind of advantage.
Such evidence is at odds with the so-called Porter hypothesis (see [3], [4]), which advocates
a kind of win-win situation induced by more stringent environmental norms (see a game-
theoretic foundation for Porter hypothesis in [5]. However, for most environmental economists,
it seems clear that enforcing stricter environmental norms should negatively aﬀect economic
performance, at least in the short run. Whether such a regulation could induce further
innovations and generate at some point in time highly eﬃcient technologies in all respects
(see for example [6]) is not discussed in this paper. We restrict our attention to ﬁnite and
relatively short time horizons. In such a context, a trade-oﬀ between economic performance
and environmental eﬃciency is hardly questionable.
Beside the empirical arguments, there might be several mechanisms leading to such a trade-
oﬀ. Of course, one should ﬁrst mention the direct output losses due, for example, to more
stringent emission norms (as in the Kyoto protocol, see [7], for a discussion). In the short
run, an additional economic ineﬃciency is likely to arise if the compliance to more stringent
environmental norms implies costly development and adoption of new and less polluting
technologies. In this paper, we abstract from R&D eﬀorts and use output losses to proxy
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cost increases. In a benchmark case we consider a country that can continue using an old
technology or switch to a cleaner but less productive technology (because of the involved
adoption costs). Adoption costs are usually associated with a transitory or permanent fall in
productivity (see a survey in [8]), and we shall also use this argument in our context.
Here we sketch a base for our model. Adopting a new technology can be immediate or
delayed. Individuals populating the economy dislike pollution and enjoy large output. (Hence,
a trade-oﬀ arises formally because one unit of output could be sacriﬁced for so-many units of
abated pollution.) Furthermore, we do not include any compulsory environmental norms in the
model, and allow choices to be made on the basis of a simple trade-oﬀ model. In the benchmark
case, the problem will be formulated as a two-stage optimal control problem as in [9], who
extended previous contributions of [10] and [11]. In this paper, we shall go a step further
and embed the benchmark two-stage optimal control problem in a two-country game-theoretic
context.
We shall show that whether the less polluting technology is adopted or not, relies heavily
on the strategic ingredients of our model like the data on marginal productivity and marginal
propensity to pollution of the new technology. The 2006 Canadian decision to withdraw from
the Kyoto protocol and to join the opposing club is a clear signal of the ongoing tensions
and strategic steps taken all over the world, in this speciﬁc ﬁeld. These tensions reﬂect
the pressure of many national and international lobby groups. In the case of Canada, the
manufacturing sector as represented by the CME (Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters),
has made repeatedly clear that the commitments and the measures adopted to meet Kyoto
requirements must “...be part of a meaningful international strategy for limiting atmospheric
greenhouse gases ... and lead to genuine reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that are
measurable, veriﬁable, practical, and economically feasible...”.∗ Clearly, the US decision to
∗See the web site at http://www.cme-mec.ca/kyoto/.
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act unilaterally and not ratify the Kyoto protocol is strong evidence that this country does
not perceive optimal joining the Kyoto club. Undoubtedly, this decision can only encourage
self-interested behavior of other countries.
Here is a brief outline of how this paper is organized. The next section solves the benchmark
problem of an isolated country facing a short-run trade-oﬀ between an economic and an
environmental eﬃciency. Section 3 considers a two-country open-loop Nash game and also
comments on a leader-follower version of the game. Section 4 studies the outcomes of
cooperative games. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. The benchmark optimal control problem
2.1. The model
In this section, we consider the case of an isolated economy, which therefore takes its decisions
in exclusive accordance with its own preferences and constraints. For this case, we shall develop
the computations in detail.





where C is aggregate consumption, P is the aggregate stock of pollution, and u(.)i sac o n c a v e
utility function with u

C > 0e tu

P < 0. The time horizon is T, assumed ﬁnite in this framework
and ρ is the discount rate.
It should be noted here that adding a scrap value (as a function of the stock of pollution at
the terminal date T for example) will not change the main results of the paper. ∗
On the production side, we have an elementary one-sector structure: the production function
∗All formulae derivations are available upon request from the authors.
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is assumed to be of the AK type, and output is either used for consumption or as an input,
X:
Y = C + X = F(X)=Ai X ⇒ C ≡ X(Ai − 1) (2)
where Ai > 1 is the marginal productivity of input in technology i. We will restrict our
attention in this paper to i =1 ,2w h e r ei = 1 refers to the “current” technology and i =2t o
the “new” technology.
The stock of pollution is assumed to evolve proportionally to the production level:
˙ P = αiAiX, (3)
with P(0) ≥ 0g i v e n .A sAiX is output, αi measures the marginal contribution to pollution
of an additional production unit. Clean technologies would therefore be associated with low
values of αi and highly productive technologies would have large Ai.
As said after (1), we assume that P(T)i sf r e e ∗ in this benchmark case. Given a pollution
objective at the terminal date T, we could have assumed that P(T)i sg i v e n .T h i sw o u l dn o t
aﬀect our results.∗
Hereafter, we shall represent any technological menu by a pair of positive numbers (Ai,α i).
We assume that at t = 0 the economy is equipped with technology (A1,α 1) but another menu
(A2,α 2) is also available with α1 >α 2 > 0 but 1 <A 2 <A 1.
Here we mean several things. Cleaner technologies, presumably the “new” technologies,
involve a number of adoption costs (see [8], for a survey). For example productivity may
not be high at the early stages of the implementation of this new technique (as empirically
documented by [12]) until enough speciﬁc human capital is accumulated (as in the typical
learning-by-doing model, see [13]). Of course, such productivity losses may only be transitory,
∗Notice that, given the law of motion of the stock of pollution, and P(0) ≥ 0, we have necessarily P(t) ≥ 0,
∀t ≥ 0. Hence, P(T) > 0.
∗For transparency, we have decided to not include in this article many bulky algebraic derivations but, of
course, they are available upon request.
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as explicitly accounted for by [9]. Because of that we consider ﬁnite horizon optimization
problems in this paper. This will allow us to argue that the above mentioned productivity
losses last for the whole horizon considered and can be modeled through one parameter A2.
Hence our claim of solving a rather realistic problem of a government elected for the ﬁnite
period T.
The stylized government problem, which we solve in this paper, consists of deciding whether
the economy remains using the technology menu “1” or adopts the new technological regime
“2”, with less pollution (a2 <a 1) at the expense of less productivity (A2 <A 1), during its
ruling period. If the latter alternative is true, the government needs to announce the optimal
switching time, say t1,w i t h0≤ t1 ≤ T.










subject to (8) and (2), P0 given and P(T) free.








where menu “1” is used in [0,t 1); at t1 menu “2” is adopted and applied until the end of
horizon T.
In order to characterize our results analytically, we shall restrict our study to the following
class of utility functions:
u(C,P)=l n ( C) − βP ,
where β measures the marginal disutility due to pollution, which is assumed in our analytical
case independent of the level of the pollution stock.
2.2. Solving the optimal control problem
We solve the two-stage optimal control problem of technology adoption (4) backward in time,
as in dynamic programming (compare [10] and [11]), starting with the second possible regime.
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The calculations are elementary but rather bulky. We shall give the algebraic details of the
solution derivation in the benchmark case. The other cases are dealt with in the similar fashion.
2.2.1. Control on [t1,T] We assume that the economy will switch to the new technology at






(ln(X(t)(A2 − 1)) − βP)e−ρtdt (6)
subject to ˙ P = α2A2X,w i t hP(t1)=P1 ≥ 0g i v e na n df r e eP(T). We will use the Pontriagin’s
minimum principle to establish an optimal solution.
The corresponding Hamiltonian is deﬁned as:
H2(P,X,t,λ2)=−e−ρt (ln(X (A2 − 1)) − βP)+λ2 (α2A2 X),
and the ﬁrst-order conditions are:
−e−ρt
X
+ λ2α2A2 =0 ( 7 )
˙ P = α2 A2 X (8)
˙ λ2 = −e−ρtβ, λ 2(T)P(T)=0. (9)





where c is a constant that will be determined using the transversality condition. Since P1 ≥ 0,
thus P(T) > 0 by the law of motion of the stock of pollution and the transversality condition












We can now calculate the remaining variables.
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e−ρt 1 − e−ρT
β
(13)









1 − e−ρ(T−t) ,t ∈ [t1,T]
(14)
For the discussion on existence of t1 such that 0 <t 1 <T ,w ew i l ln e e dt h ee x p r e s s i o no f
the optimal Hamiltonian for the “second” regime at any date between t1 and T.A f t e rs o m e
algebra, the optimal Hamiltonian H∗
2(P1,t 1)e q u a l s
H∗
2(P1,t 1)=e−ρt1 
1 − Q2 + ρt1 + βP1 +l n ( e−ρt1 − e−ρT)

where
Q2 ≡ ln(ρ) − ln(α2A2β)+l n ( A2 − 1). (15)
We notice that formulae (14) and (13) derived for t ∈ [t1,T] are valid for any t1 ≥ 0( i.e.,
including t1 = 0). This enables us to formulate a corollary regarding the optimal behavior of
the central planner for any uninterrupted control period.
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Corollary 1. A central planner that is maximizing a discounted stream of diﬀerences between
utility from consumption and disutility from pollution, expressed as (6), chooses an increasing
input path (14), which is inverse proportional to the pollution accumulation speed. The resulting
pollution accumulation path is hence independent of the production and pollution technologies.
We infer from the corollary that “no matter” the damage caused by pollution, measured by
 T
t1 e−ρtβP(t)dt, the planner is able to choose an input path Xi(t) (and hence consumption
(Ai − 1)X(t)) that maximizes the “trade-oﬀ” utility function (6).
2.2.2. Control on [0,t 1] Consider (4) and (5). We have already solved the problem on [t1,T].
Given optimal control (14) and pollution stock at t1 (i.e., P(t1)) we can calculate the optimal
utility for this part of the horizon; will will denote it a U∗
2(P1,t 1). Hence, to compute optimal






(ln(X(t)(A1 − 1)) − βP(t))e−ρtdt + U∗
2(P1,t 1) (16)
subject to ˙ P (t)=α1A1X(t), 0 ≤ t<t 1,w i t hP0 given and P1 = P(t1) free. Hence the old
technology problem (menu “1”) is with free end point and free terminal time.
The corresponding Hamiltonian∗ is
H1(P,X,t,λ1)=−e−ρt (ln(X (A1 − 1)) − βP)+λ1 (α1 A1X),
and the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions:
−e−ρt
X
+ λ1α1A1 = 0 (17)
˙ P = α1 A1 X (18)
˙ λ1 = −e−ρtβ. (19)
Following [10] we use
λ1(t1)=λ2(t1) (20)
∗Actually, for problems with free terminal time, an extended Hamiltonian is needed i.e., one which includes a
costate responsible for the time variable. However, [10] shows that this in not necessary in this case.
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Notice that (21) does not depend on t1. This is a result of using (20) to calibrate an indeﬁnite
integral of (19).
We can formulate the following corollary by comparing (21) to (11).
Corollary 2. The pollution shadow price λ(t) is independent of the technological menu i.e.,
it is the same for each technological choice.
This means that a central planner that is maximizing a discounted stream of diﬀerences
between utility from consumption and disutility from pollution, expressed as (6), perceives
disutility due to the accumulated pollution P(t) as a (decreasing) function of time only.
Now, just like in the new technology regime problem (menu “2”, treated in Section 2.2.1),
we can ﬁnd the optimal path for the stock of pollution, P(t), and the production input X(t),








where c1 is a constant, which results from the initial condition P0 = P(0):
















,t ∈ [0,t 1]. (24)









1 − e−ρ(T−t) ,t ∈ [0,t 1]. (25)
This is suﬃcient for us to compute the optimal value of intertemporal utility as a function of
(P1,t 1) and also of the Hamiltonian corresponding to the old technology regime. In particular,
the value of the Hamiltonian at the P1,t 1
H1(P1,t 1)=−e
−ρt1 (ln(X(t1)(A1 − 1)) − βP(t1)) + λ1(t1)(α1A1X(t1))
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−ρt1 (1 − Q1 + ρt1 + βc1),
where
Q1 =l n ( ρ) − ln(α1A1β)+l n ( A1 − 1). (26)
and c1 is as in (23).
We are now ready to answer the crucial question about an optimal interior switching date
t1.
2.2.3. Existence of optimal t1 One can determine the optimal switching time from the
optimality condition, see [10]:
H∗
2(P1,t 1) − H∗
1(P1,t 1) = 0 (27)
where both Hamiltonian values were computed previously as:
H∗




−ρt1 (1 − Q2 + ρt1 − βc2) .
This yields
e−ρt1 (Q1 − Q2)=0. (28)
However, this means that there is no interior switching time unless Q1 = Q2, see (15) and
(26). In that case the planner is indiﬀerent between the two technological regimes; moreover,
t1 c a nt a k ea n yv a l u eo n[ 0 ,T].
Corner solutions (i.e., starting the new technology either at time 0 or never) were
theoretically pointed out in in [10]] and in [11]. According to (28) the economy should postpone
the new technology adoption indeﬁnitely (i.e., t1 →∞ ).
The following corollary is a consequence of (28).
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Corollary 3. The suﬃcient and necessary condition for never-adopting the new technology is








Symmetrically, the suﬃcient and necessary condition for an immediate adoption of the new








The above conditions have a simple economic interpretation. A marginal increase in input
X increases output by Ai and consumption by Ai−1 and contributes to the stock of pollution
by αiAi. Condition (NA) says that the economy should never adopt the new technology, which
is less polluting (a2 <a 1) but also less productive (A2 <A 1) than the old one, if the ratio
of marginal pollution to marginal consumption for the new technology dominates the ratio
calculated for the old technology.
If (IA) holds, then the economy should immediately adopt the less polluting technology that
guarantees a lower ratio of marginal pollution to marginal consumption.
In simple terms, the implemented technology assures a high consumption i.e., Ai −1 will be
large, or a low pollution i.e., αiAi will be small (or both).
3. A two-country problem
3.1. The model
Assume that there are two countries a and b that suﬀer from the same pollution stock.
This is a frequent case of countries with a common border that are using similar production
technologies. Similarly to [could you cite?.. you have written that this “is a usual assumption
in related papers” .. ] we shall assume that these countries do not trade in goods. This will
help analytical tractability of the problem. Nevertheless, we believe that countries’ trade may
Copyright c   2008 Authors Optim. Control Appl. Meth. 2008; 00:0–0
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be limited if their economies’ products are substitutes rather than complements. Again, this
is non-unfrequent among neighboring regions.








with k ∈{ a,b}. The production function, in the consumption goods sector, is AK; output is















i > 1 is marginal productivity of input in country k.
The main diﬀerence with respect to the benchmark case is in the evolution of the pollution
stock, which now follows





That is, both countries contribute to the common stock of pollution depending on the level of
their production and technology in use.
The technological menus accessible to each countries are indexed “i,k” hence need not be
the same. This might be due to diﬀerent technological innovation and/or absorption capacities.
However, menu “2” may be identical for each country.
We shall keep the planners’ utility functions identical and equal to the utility function dealt
with in the benchmark case i.e.,
uk(C,P)=l n ( C) − βk P,
where βk can diﬀer between the countries. We will now study how the benchmark solution
identiﬁed in Section 2 is altered by the two-country context.
We believe that although knowledge about disutility from pollution X(t) is well developed
in each country, the actual measurements of P(t) are diﬃcult and largely unreliable. This
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enables us to restrict the analysis to open-loop Nash equilibria. As it is well known, the open-
loop Nash equilibrium in an N-players diﬀerential game is found by solving N optimal control
problems taking as given the strategies of other players.
3.2. A two-stage open-loop Nash equilibrium
3.2.1. The optimization problem of player a Player a seeks her best strategy, given the
strategy of the other player. For simplicity we suppose that the other player keeps the
technology unchanged for the entire optimization horizon [0,T].∗ Because most of the (rather
involved) computations are very similar to those of the benchmark case, we will skip most of
the intermediate steps.












2 − 1)) − βP)e−ρtdt (32)
subject to








b(t), if t ≥ t1; (33)
˙ P = αa
1Aa
1Xa(t)+αb Ab Xb(t), if t<t 1 , (34)
with P0 given, P(T) free, and Xb(t)g i v e n .
This problem is similar to the benchmark problem with the unique diﬀerence that the state
equation now involves an additive forcing term αb Ab Xb(t). However, the contribution of this
term to optimal decisions of player a is null because the derivatives of the Hamiltonian of this
player do not depend on Xb. Hence, the outcomes of the benchmark model are also valid in
this case. This becomes clear by the following derivations.
We proceed to solve the problem of player a beginning form period [t1,T], as in Section 2.
∗his assumption could easily be relaxed and the main results generated in that case would not be altered; see
[14].
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3.2.2. Control on [t1,T] Suppose that country a decides to adopt the new technology at


























˙ P = α2Aa
2Xa + αbAbXb (36)
˙ λa




Using the transversality condition, one can obtain, as in the benchmark case, the solution path



















b(t)dt and ˜ p is a
constant determined by P(t1) i.e., the amount of pollution accumulated at time t1:




















1 − e−ρ(T−t) . (40)
Finally, we can write the optimal Hamiltonian Ha
2(.); in particular at the assumed switching








2 + ρt1 + β
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where Qa
2 =l n ( ρ) − ln(αa
2Aa
2βa)+l n ( Aa
2 − 1).
3.2.3. Control on [0,t 1] The second step of the solution procedure works as in Section 2.2.2.



















with αb, Ab and Xb(t) given. This optimal control problem has the same ﬁrst-order conditions
as the problem corresponding to the new technology i.e., (35) to (37) with menu “1” replacing
menu “2”. Obviously, the transversality condition is diﬀerent than (38). Instead, one has to
































The solution paths for the stock of pollution, production input and the resulting optimal








































Xb(t)dt (so, Z(0) = 0). We denote Qa
1 =l n ( ρ) − ln(αa
AAa
Aβa)+l n( Aa
1 − 1); a
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constant determined by an initial condition on P(0) is ˆ p:















3.2.4. Existence of optimal t1 It is now possible to derive the optimality condition with
respect to the switching time t1, an interior optimum would arise if and only if




















1 + ρt1 + β





















Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium here obtained generates a case in which each country
plays “selﬁsh” i.e., independently of what the other country is doing.
3.3. Discussion
The above result may be found surprising. To explain it, we ﬁrst formulate a corollary based
of the comparison of (44) to (39).
Corollary 4. The pollution shadow price λ(t) is independent of the technological menu of
either country.
So, as in Corollary 2, we observe that solving the “trade-oﬀ” optimization problem (32)-(34)
has led us to input strategies that “compensate” the damage done by pollution so that the
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shadow price of the latter depends on the running time only, and not on a technological regime.
Hence, the trade-oﬀs in the Nash equilibrium are similar to those faced by an isolated country.
As said in the above corollary, the marginal pollution cost is independent of whether the
stock of pollution has increased by the action of other player. For any production proﬁle of
country b, the stock of pollution increases by αa
iAa
i ,i fc o u n t r ya rises its production input by
one unit. In equilibrium, each country’s contribution to the stock of pollution rises by ρ/βk
multiplied by an increasing time-dependent weight and this is how each country “manages”
the growing pollution stock.
We notice that Corollary 3 is also applicable to the two-country context and, in particular,
the conditions (NA) and (IA) determine whether a country adopts a new technology
immediately or never.
Nonetheless, one would think that the willingness to adopt a new technology should be
diﬀerent in the two-country case. This could be because the other player also contributes to
the total stock of pollution, which should induce some strategic interaction to the game. We
propose the following framework to analyze this issue now.
We have assumed in our calculations that player b follows a corner regime i.e., either chooses
the new technology immediately or never. That it is: αb(t)=αb and Ab(t)=Ab, for all t.
Now, we consider a game with αb(t),A b(t) possibly varying in time. By construction, if the
coeﬃcients vary, they are piecewise constant with one discontinuity point, say t , which would
be the technology adoption date by country b.D e n o t i n gb yZ(t) an indeﬁnite integral of
function αb(t)Ab(t)Xb(t)( i n s t e a do fj u s tXb(t), as before) we would obtain the optimality
condition for an interior switching time of country a that would show the one-sided limits of
αb(t), Ab(t), Xb(t)a n dZ(t) to the left and to the right of the switching point of country a,
t1. We could prove that all these terms would vanish because these functions are piecewise
constant... unless t1 is also the switching date of the country b. This problem was studied as
a special case in [14] whose ﬁndings are summarized in Section 3.4.
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However, in a non-cooperative game, studied in this section, the general result is that each
country plays “selﬁshly” i.e., independently of what the strategy of the other country is.
Of course, our result relies on the simple model that allowed us to obtain an analytical
characterization of the solutions. However, we believe that our model and results capture recent
behavior of some countries. Clean technologies are often rejected by countries which typically
put forward the resulting fall in production (and thus in consumption) as the reason. In terms
of our model, such countries are not willing to switch to cleaner technology because they are
able to rise consumption under the old technology to “compensate” the disutility caused by
increasing pollution. A parallel explanation is that the resulting relative fall in consumption
would be valued much higher than the subsequent relative gain in pollution control. Typically,
those countries are insensitive to the fact that other countries (even neighboring countries with
common resources) have or have not chosen to adopt (partially or totally) cleaner technologies,
which is predicted by our model. The reverse holds too.
In such a context, a question arises whether a cooperative (or “eﬃcient”) solution exists.
Our model can deliver some simple conclusions also in this respect, see Section 4. However,
we ﬁrst comment on a leader-follower game.
3.4. A leader-follower game
In [14] the two-country game was modeled as a leader-follower problem. We refer to that paper
for the solution derivations. Here, we summarize the ﬁndings.
Corollary 5. In a two-country open-loop Stackelberg game of technology adoption, the
pollution shadow prices are independent of the technological menu of either country.
This conclusion leads to a set of suﬃcient conditions for technology adoption that are
identical with (IA) and (NA). The leader will play “selﬁshly”, whatever the behavior and
characteristics of the follower and so will play the follower.
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It appears that in technology adoption games modeled as trade-oﬀ problems, cooperation
may be the only way to prevent agents’ selﬁsh decisions. We examine this issue in the next
section.
4. An eﬃcient solution
4.1. The model and solution
We assume that if the two countries adopt the new technology then they do it at the same time

















































2Xb(t), if t ≥ t1, (49)




1Xb(t), if t<t 1 (50)
where P0 given and P(T) free. We shall solve the above problem starting from [t1,T]a si n
the previous cases. Again, we will skip the intermediate easy but cumbersome algebra.
Control on [t1,T]. The Hamiltonian corresponding to the new technology regime is
H2 = −e−ρt 
ln(Xa(Aa
2 − 1)) + ln(Xb(Ab
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This canonical system of equations can be solved using the usual transversality condition and
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the initial condition P(t1)i s˜ p:







Control on [0,t 1]. The Hamiltonian corresponding to the ﬁrst technology regime is
H1 = −e−ρt 
ln(Xa(Aa
1 − 1)) + ln(Xb(Ab
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and the resulting optimality conditions are the same as the previous ones, after allowing for
the correct technological parameters.




1 ), allows us to calibrate the optimal path of the
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); as before, ˆ p is a
constant determined by P(0). After some more algebra, one gets:
P1(t)=P0 +
2






Existence of t1. An interior optimizer t1 has to satisfy the following condition:
H2 − H1 =
e−ρt1 
2 − Q2 +2 ρt1 +( βa + βb)˜ p

− e−ρt1 
2 − Q1 +2 ρt1 +( βa + βb)˜ p

=0 ;
it leads us to the same condition as before
e−ρt1 (Q1 − Q2)=0 .
Again, there is no rationale to adopt (jointly) the new technology at an interior date. It is
optimal to immediately start using it if Q1 <Q 2 or inﬁnitely postpone, if Q1 >Q 2.
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We notice (55) looks more complicated than (NA) and (IA) and promises a meaningful analysis
of the technology adoption process in a coalition of two cooperating countries.
4.2. Discussion
We are particularly interested in the identiﬁcation of cases where cooperation changes the
decision of a country regarding the technology adoption.
We known from Corollary 3 that a country alone, say a, will not adopt the new technology




































Therefore, country a will adopt the new technology under cooperation if country b’s “new”
technology compensates the unfavorable trade-oﬀ that a faces, if it acts on its own.
We can rewrite (56) to better examine the diﬀerence between the cooperative solution and










































































  1. (57)
Therefore it is easier for country a to satisfy (56) than (IA).
Cooperation schemes may involve some transfers between countries. Our framework allows
implicitly for this phenomenon. In considering (56)-(56), we have seen that country a,w h i c hi s
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initially reluctant to adopt the new technology, is willing to do so under cooperation, because
it will then beneﬁt from the transfers from the partner country.
On the other hand, country b, which alone would have switched to relatively less eﬃcient
technologies (with respect to the cooperative solution), would not accept to do so if it had to
support the burden of cooperation with a markedly lagging country, and would only switch to
the new technology if the menu allowed it to pay for this burden, see (57).
Of course, this reasoning is relevant for cases of heterogenous technological achievements, for
example when we deal with a developing and a developed country. However, it is also relevant
for the North-North relations since the development of clean technologies is on the top of the
R&D priorities of all Northern countries. But while it is quite natural to call for technological
transfers from North to South, it is more diﬃcult to do so with respect to Western democracies.
R&D is costly for all countries, and if an advanced countrya does not have access to the most
eﬃcient clean technologies, it is typically because it did not invest in the related speciﬁc R&D
or had no incentive to acquire them. In such a case, technology transfers make little sense.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we model economic performance vs. environmental eﬃciency trade-oﬀs. For that
purpose we use a canonical two-stage optimal-control problem embedded in a game-theoretic
structure. We focus on a short-time horizon perspective to make the trade-oﬀs sharper.
Our main result is that, unless cooperating, the countries play selﬁshly. Having a “dirty” or
“clean” neighbor does not aﬀect a country’s own decision.
The cooperation problem is diﬃcult as it implies that a “very” good technology is available.
Such a technology would have to “compensate” the losses the country, which would have
adopted the technology on its own, would incur to convince the neighbor reluctantto implement
it on its own. This suggests the future of international agreements and protocols, like Kyoto, is
certainly not obvious. If “very” good technologies do not exist and hence cooperative solutions
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are not implementable, then the countries will adopt the “only” good technologies one by
one, if this is optimal for them. The recent Canadian decision of withdrawing from the Kyoto
protocol is an illustration of our model predictions. We believe that while our set-up is quite
canonical, our results display a degree of reality.
Improvements to our model are obviously possible and include more economic controls
(like R&D and pollution abatement policies). An introduction of explicit pollution (state)
constraints would help generate internal switching times.∗ Unfortunately, such model
extensions damage the analytical solution characterization. Henceforth, our current and further
research involves generation of parameter speciﬁc outcomes.
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